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Abstract
Distributed algorithms provide flexibility over centralized algorithms for resource allocation
problems, e.g., cyber-physical systems. However, the distributed nature of these algorithms
often makes the systems susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks, especially when messages
are transmitted between price-taking agents and a central coordinator. We propose a resilient
strategy for distributed algorithms under the framework of primal-dual distributed optimiza-
tion. We formulate a robust optimization model that accounts for Byzantine attacks on the
communication channels between agents and coordinator. We propose a resilient primal-dual
algorithm using state-of-the-art robust statistics methods. The proposed algorithm is shown to
converge to a neighborhood of the robust optimization model, where the neighborhood’s radius
is proportional to the fraction of attacked channels.
1 Introduction
Consider the following multi-agent optimization problem involving the average of parameters in
the constraints:
min
θi∈Rd,∀i
U(θ) := 1
N
∑N
i=1 Ui(θi)
s.t. gt
(
1
N
∑N
i=1 θi
)
≤ 0, t = 1, ..., T,
θi ∈ Ci, i = 1, ..., N,
(1)
where both Ui : R
d → R and gt : Rd → R are continuously differentiable, convex functions, and Ci
is a compact convex set in Rd. We let 0 ∈ Ci and
max
θ,θ′∈Ci
‖θ − θ′‖ ≤ R, i = 1, ..., N, (2)
such that R is an upper bound on the diameters of Ci.
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Problem (1) arises in many resource allocation problems with a set of potentially nonlinear con-
straints on the amount of allowable resources, see Section 1.1 for a detailed exploration.
We consider a system where there exists a central coordinator and N agents. In this context, the
function Ui(θi) and parameter θi are the utility of the ith agent and the resource controlled by agent
i, respectively. As the agents work independently, it is desirable to design algorithms that allow the
N agents to solve (1) cooperatively through communication with the central coordinator. Among
others, the primal-dual optimization methods [1] have been advocated as they naturally give rise to
decomposable algorithms that favor distributed implementation [2]. In addition to their practical
success, these methods are supported by strong theoretical guarantees where fast convergence to
an optimal solution of (1) is well established. However, the distributed nature of these methods
also exposes the system to vulnerabilities not faced by traditional centralized systems. Precisely,
existing algorithms assume the agents, and the communication links between central server and
agents, to be completely trustworthy. However, an attacker can take over a sub-system operated
by the agents, and deliberately edit the messages in these communication links, i.e., a Byzantine
attack. This might result in an unstable system with possible damages to hardware and the system
overall.
In this paper, we propose strategies for securing primal-dual distributed algorithms, e.g., in [1],
tailored to solving a relaxed version of the resource allocation problem (1). A key observation
is that the existing algorithms depend on reliably computing the average of a set of parameter
vectors, {θi}Ni=1, transmitted by the agents. As a remedy, we apply robust statistics techniques as
a subroutine, therefore proposing a resilient distributed algorithm that is proven to converge to a
neighborhood of the optimal solution of a robust version of (1).
Vulnerabilities of various types of distributed algorithms have been identified and addressed in a
number of recent studies. Relevant examples are [3–7] which study secure decentralized algorithms
on a general network topology but consider consensus-based optimization models. Moreover, [8–10]
consider a similar optimization architecture as this paper, yet they focus on securing distributed
algorithms for machine learning tasks which assumes i.i.d. functions, a fundamentally different
setting from the current paper. Our work is also related to the literature on robust statistics
[11, 12], and particularly, with the recently rekindled research efforts on high dimensional robust
statistics [13–15]. These works will be the working horse for our attack resilient algorithm.
Our contributions and organization are as follows. First, we derive a formal model for attack
resilient resource allocation via a conservative approximation for the robust optimization problem
[cf. Section 3]. Second, we apply and derive new robust estimation results to secure distributed
resource allocation algorithms [cf. Section 4]. Third, we provide a non-asymptotic convergence
guarantee of the proposed attack resilient algorithm [cf. Section 4.1]. In particular, our algorithm
is shown to converge to a O(α2) neighborhood to the optimal solution of (1), where α ∈ [0, 12) is
the fraction of attacked links.
Notations. Unless otherwise specified, ‖ · ‖ denotes the standard Euclidean norm. For any N ∈ N,
[N ] denotes the finite set {1, ..., N}.
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1.1 Motivating Examples
Our set-up here can be employed in a wide range of optimization problems for resource allocation
and networked control in multi-agent systems, e.g., in the pioneering example of congestion control
in data networks [16,17]; in determining the optimal price of electricity and enabling more efficient
demand supply balancing (a.k.a. demand response) in smart power distribution systems [18, 19];
in managing user transmit powers and data rates in wireless cellular networks [20]; in determining
optimal caching policies by content delivery networks [21]; in optimizing power consumption in
wireless sensor networks with energy-restricted batteries [22,23]; and in designing congestion control
systems in urban traffic networks [24]. These examples would have different utility functions and
constraint sets that can be handled through our general formulation in (1). For example, in the
power/rate control problem in data networks, the cost functions are usually logarithmic functions
associated with rate θi, e.g., Ui(θi) = −βi log(θi). In demand response applications in power
distribution systems, the utilities capture the users’ benefits from operating their electric appliances
under different settings. For example, we can capture the cost function of temperature θi controlled
by a price-responsive air conditioner as Ui(θi) = bi(θi−θcomf)2−ci [19]. In terms of constraints, our
general nonlinear constraint formulation can not only capture common linear resource constraints
such as link capacity in data networks [16,17], but can also handle important non-linear constraints
arising in many different applications. For example, in radial power distribution systems, nonlinear
convexified power flow constraints can be included for distributed demand response optimization (to
see a description of distribution system power flow constraints, see, e.g., [25, 26]). This can enable
our algorithm to perform demand supply balancing in power disribution systems in a distributed
and resilient fashion.
2 Primal-dual Algorithm for Resource Allocation
This section reviews the basic primal-dual algorithm for resource allocation. Let λ ∈ RT+ be the
dual variable. We consider the Lagrangian function of (1):
L({θi}Ni=1;λ) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
Ui(θi) +
T∑
t=1
λt gt
( 1
N
N∑
i=1
θi
)
.
Assuming strong duality holds (e.g., under the Slater’s condition), solving problem (1) is equivalent
to solving its dual problem:
max
λ∈RT+
min
θi∈Ci,∀i
L({θi}Ni=1;λ). (P)
For a given λ, the inner minimization of (P) is known as the Lagrangian relaxation of (1), which
can be interpreted as a penalized resource allocation problem [19].
In a distributed setting, the goal is to solve (1) where the agents only observe a pricing signal
received from the central coordinator, and this pricing signal is to be updated iteratively at the
central coordinator. As suggested in [1], we apply the primal-dual algorithm (PDA) to a regularized
version of (P). Let us define
Lυ({θi}Ni=1;λ) :=
L({θi}Ni=1;λ) + υ2N
∑N
i=1 ‖θi‖2 − υ2‖λ‖2,
(3)
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Algorithm 1 PD-DRA Procedure.
1: for k = 1, 2, ... do
2: (Message exchanges stage):
(a) Central coordinator receives {θ(k)i }Ni=1 from agents and computes θ
(k)
, {∇θgt(θ(k))}Tt=1.
(b) Central coordinator broadcasts the vectors θ
(k)
, g(k) :=
∑T
t=1 λ
(k)
t ∇θgt(θ
(k)
) to agents.
3: (Computation stage):
(a) Agent i computes the update for θ
(k+1)
i according to (4a) using the received θ
(k)
.
(b) The central coordinator computes the update for λ(k+1) according to (4b).
4: end for
such that Lυ(·) is υ-strongly convex and υ-strongly concave in {θi}Ni=1 and λ, respectively. Let
k ∈ Z+ be the iteration index, γ > 0 be the step sizes, the PDA recursion is described by:
θ
(k+1)
i = (4a)
PCi
(
θ
(k)
i − γ∇θiLυ({θ(k)i }Ni=1;λ(k))
)
,∀ i ∈ [N ]
λ(k+1) =
[
λ(k) + γ∇λLυ({θ(k)i }Ni=1;λ(k))
]
+
(4b)
where PCi(·) is the Euclidean projection operator, [·]+ denotes max{0, ·}, and the gradients are:
∇θiLυ({θ(k)i }Ni=1;λ(k)) = 1N
(
∇θiUi(θ(k)i ) + υ θ(k)i
+
∑T
t=1 λ
(k)
t ∇θgt(θ)
∣∣∣
θ= 1
N
∑N
i=1 θ
(k)
i
)
,
(5)
[∇λLυ({θ(k)i }Ni=1;λ(k))]t = gt( 1N ∑i=1θ(k)i )− υ λ(k)t , (6)
for all i, t. We denoted [x]t as the tth element of x ∈ RT . In particular, observe that (4) performs
a projected gradient descent/ascent on the primal/dual variables.
From the above, both gradients with respect to (w.r.t.) θi and λt depend only on the average
parameter θ
(k)
:= 1
N
∑N
i=1 θ
(k)
i . We summarize the primal dual distributed resource allocation
(PD-DRA) procedure in Algorithm 1. In addition to solving the general problem (1), Algorithm 1
also serves as a general solution method to popular resource allocation problems [19].
As the regularized primal-dual problem is strongly convex/concave in primal/dual variables, Al-
gorithm 1 converges linearly to an optimal solution [1]. To study this, let us denote z(k) =
({θ(k)i }Ni=1,λ(k)) as the primal-dual variable at the kth iteration,
Φ(z(k)) :=
(
∇θLυ({θ(k)i }Ni=1,λ(k))
∇λLυ({θ(k)i }Ni=1,λ(k))
)
. (7)
Fact 1. [1, Theorem 3.5] Assume that the map Φ(z(k)) is LΦ Lipschitz continuous. For all k ≥ 1,
we have
‖z(k+1) − z⋆‖2 ≤ (1− 2γυ + γ2L2Φ) ‖z(k) − z⋆‖2 , (8)
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Central Coordinator
Agent i Agent j
get g(k)
send θ
(k)
i
Attacked!
Figure 1: Illustrating the PD-DRA algorithm under attack. The uplink for agent j is compromised
such that the correct θ
(k)
j is not transmitted to the central node. The up/downlink for agent i are
operating properly.
where z⋆ is a saddle point to the regularized version of (P). Setting γ = υ/L2Φ gives ‖z(k+1)−z⋆‖2 ≤(
1− υ2/L2Φ
)‖z(k) − z⋆‖2, ∀ k ≥ 1.
3 Problem Formulation
Despite the simplicity and the strong theoretical guarantee, the PD-DRA method is susceptible to
attacks on the channels between the central coordinator and the agents, as described below.
Attack Model. We consider a situation when uplink channels between agents and the central
coordinator are compromised [see Fig. 1]. Let A ⊂ [N ] be the set of compromised uplink channels,
whose identities are unknown to the central coordinator. We define H := [N ] \ A as the set of
trustworthy channels. At iteration k, instead of receiving θ
(k)
i from each agent i ∈ [N ] [cf. Step 2(a)],
the central coordinator receives the following messages:
r
(k)
i =
{
θ
(k)
i , if i ∈ H,
b
(k)
i , if i ∈ A.
(9)
We focus on a Byzantine attack scenario such that the messages, b
(k)
i , communicated on the at-
tacked channels can be arbitrary. Under such scenario, if the central coordinator forms the naive
average θ̂(k) = 1/N
∑N
i=1 r
(k)
i and computes the gradients ∇gt(θ̂(k)) accordingly, this may result
in uncontrollable error since the deviation θ̂(k) − (1/N)∑Ni=1 θ(k)i can be arbitrarily large. It is
anticipated that the PD-DRA method would not provide a solution to the regularized version of
(P).
Robust Optimization Model. In light of the Byzantine attack, it is impossible to optimize the
original problem (P) since the contribution from Ui(·) : i ∈ A becomes unknown to the central
coordinator. As a compromise, we focus on optimizing the cost function of agents with trustworthy
uplinks and the following robust optimization problem as our target model:
min
θi∈Ci,i∈H
1
|H|
∑
i∈H Ui(θi) (10a)
s.t. max
θj∈Cj ,j∈A
gt
(
1
N
∑N
i=1 θi
)
≤ 0, ∀ t, (10b)
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note that {θj}j∈A is taken away from the decision variables and we have included (10b) to account
for the worst case scenario for the resource usage of the agents with compromised uplinks. This is
to ensure that the physical operation limit of the system will not be violated under attack. Consider
the following assumption which will be assumed throughout the paper:
H1. For all θ ∈ Rd, the gradient of gt is bounded with ‖∇gt(θ)‖ ≤ B and is L-Lipschitz continuous.
We define
gt(θ) := gt(θ) +
|A|
N
(
RB + 12LR
2
)
, (11)
Lemma 1. Under H1. The following problem yields a conservative approximation of (10), i.e., its
feasible set is a subset of the feasible set of (10):
min
θi∈Ci,i∈H
1
|H|
∑
i∈H Ui(θi)
s.t. gt
(
1
N
∑
i∈H θi
) ≤ 0, ∀ t ∈ [T ], (12)
Similar to PD-DRA, we define the regularized Lagrangian function of (12) as:
Lυ({θi}i∈H;λ;H)
:= 1|H|
∑
i∈HUi(θi) +
∑T
t=1λt gt
(
1
N
∑
i∈H θi
)
+ υ2|H|
∑
i∈H ‖θi‖2 − υ2‖λ‖2.
(13)
Again, the regularized Lagrangian function is υ-strongly convex and concave in θ and λ, respec-
tively.
Our main task is to tackle the following modified problem of (P) under Byzantine attack on (some
of) the uplinks:
max
λ∈RT+
min
θi∈Ci,∀i∈H
Lυ({θi}i∈H;λ;H), (P’)
and we let ẑ⋆ = (θ̂⋆, λ̂⋆) be the optimal solution to (P’). Notice that (P’) bears a similar form as (P)
and thus one may apply the PD-DRA method to the former naturally. However, such application
requires the central coordinator to compute the sample average
θ
(k)
H :=
1
|H|
∑
i∈H θ
(k)
i , (14)
at each iteration. However, the above might not be computationally feasible under the attack
model, since the central coordinator is oblivious to the identity of H. This is the main objective in
the design of our scheme.
4 Robust Distributed Resource Allocation
In this section, we describe two estimators for approximating θ
(k)
H [cf. (14)] from the received
messages (9) without knowing the identity of links inH. To simplify notations, we define α ≥ |A|/N
as a known upper bound to the fraction of compromised channels and assume α < 1/2 where less
than half of the channels are compromised.
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As discussed after (14), the problem at hand is robust mean estimation, whose applications to
robust distributed optimization has been considered in the machine learning literature [9, 10, 14]
under the assumption that the ‘trustworthy’ signals are drawn i.i.d. from a Gaussian distribution.
Our setting is different since the signals θ
(k)
i , i ∈ H are variables from the previous iteration whose
distribution is non-Gaussian in general. Our analysis will be developed without such assumption
on the distribution.
We first consider a simple median-based estimator applied to each coordinate j = 1, ..., d. First,
define the coordinate-wise median as:[
θ
(k)
med
]
j
= med
({[r(k)i ]j}Ni=1), (15)
where med(·) computes the median of the operand. Then, our estimator is computed as the mean
of the nearest (1− α)N neighbors of [θ(k)med]j . To formally describe this, let us define:
N (k)j = {i ∈ [N ] :
∣∣[r(k)i − θ(k)med]j∣∣ ≤ r(k)j }, (16)
where r
(k)
j is chosen as |N (k)j | = (1− α)N . Our estimator is:
[θ̂
(k)
H ]j =
1
(1−α)N
∑
i∈N
(k)
j
[r
(k)
i ]j . (17)
The following bounds the performance of (17).
Proposition 1. Suppose that maxi∈H
∥∥θ(k)i − θ(k)H ∥∥∞ ≤ r, then for any α ∈ (0, 12), it holds that
∥∥θ̂(k)H − θ(k)H ∥∥ ≤ α1− α(2 +
√
(1− α)2
1− 2α
)
r
√
d . (18)
Under mild assumptions, the condition maxi∈H
∥∥θ(k)i − θ(k)H ∥∥∞ ≤ r can be satisfied with r = Θ(R),
as implied by the compactness of Ci [cf. (2)]. Moreover, for sufficiently small α, the right hand side on
(18) can be approximated by O(αR√d). However, this median-based estimator may perform poorly
for large α (especially when α → 1/2) or dimension d. For these situations, a more sophisticated
estimator is required, as detailed next.
To derive the second estimator, we apply an auxiliary result from [15] which provides an algorithm
for estimating θ
(k)
H , as summarized in Algorithm 2. We observe:
Proposition 2. [15, Proposition 16] Suppose that λmax(
1
|H|
∑
i∈H(θ
(k)
i −θ
(k)
H )(θ
(k)
i −θ
(k)
H )
⊤) ≤ σ2.
For any α ∈ [0, 14), Algorithm 2 produces an output such that ‖θ
(k)
H − θ̂(k)H ‖ = O(σ
√
α).
Again, similar to Proposition 1, the required condition above can be satisfied with σ = Θ(R) under
mild conditions. Thus, Proposition 2 states that Algorithm 2 recovers θ
(k)
H up to an error ofO(
√
αR).
Note that this bound is dimension free unlike the median estimator analyzed in Proposition 1.
The idea behind Algorithm 2 is to sequentially identify and remove the subset of points that cannot
be re-constructed from the mean of the data points. The solution of the optimization problem in
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Algorithm 2 Recovering the mean of a set [15].
1: Input: α, θ
(k)
i , ci = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , N , and B = {1, . . . , N}.
2: Set XB = [· · · θ(k)j · · · ]⊤ for j ∈ B as the concatenated data matrix.
3: Let Y ∈ Rd×d and W ∈ RB×B be the maximizer/minimizer of the saddle point problem
max
Y0,
tr(Y )≤1
min
0≤Wij ,
Wij≤
4−α
α(2+α)n
,
∑
j
Wji=1
∑
i∈B
ci(θ
(k)
i −XBwi)⊤Y (θ(k)i −XBwi)
4: Let τ∗i = (θ
(k)
i −XBwi)⊤Y (θ(k)i −XBwi).
5: if
∑
i∈B ciτ
∗
i > 4nσ
2 then
6: For i ∈ B, replace ci with
(
1− τ∗imaxj∈B τ∗j
)
ci.
7: For all i with ci <
1
2 , remove from B.
8: Go back to Line 3.
9: end if
10: Set W1 as the result of zeroing out all singular values of W that are greater than 0.9.
11: Set Z = XBW0 where W0 = (W−W1)(I−W1)-1.
12: if rank(Z) = 1 then
13: Output: θ̂
(k)
H as average of the columns of XB.
14: else
15: Output: θ̂
(k)
H as a column of Z at random.
16: end if
Line 3 measures how well can we recover the data points as an average of the other |H| points.
The bounded sample variance assumption guarantees that one can re-construct any element in the
set H from its mean, thus, all such points that introduce a large error, as quantified by ci can be
safely removed. Line 5 quantifies the magnitude of the optimal point of Line 3, and if such value
is large, such points that introduce a large error are down-weighted. The process is repeated until
the optimal solution of Line 3 is small enough and a low rank approximation of the optimal W can
be used to return the sample mean estimate.
Attack Resilient PD-DRA method. The above section provides the enabling tool for develop-
ing the resilient PD-DRA method, which we summarize in Algorithm 3. The algorithm behaves
similarly as Algorithm 1 applied to (P’), with the exception that the central coordinator is oblivi-
ous to H, and it uses a robust mean estimator to find an approximate average for the signals sent
through the trustworthy links. This approximate value is used to compute the new price signals,
and sent back to agents. In particular, the primal-dual updates are described by
θ
(k+1)
i = PCi
(
θ
(k)
i − γN
(
ĝ
(k)
H +∇Ui(θ(k)i ) + υθ(k)i
))
, (19)
λ
(k+1)
t =
[
λ
(k)
t + γ
(
gt(
|H|
N
θ̂
(k)
H )− υλ(k)t
)]
+
. (20)
Lemma 2. Algorithm 3 is a primal-dual algorithm [1] for (P’) with perturbed gradients:
ĝ
(k)
θ = ∇θLυ(θ(k);λ(k);H) + e(k)θ , (21a)
ĝ
(k)
λ = ∇λLυ(θ(k)i ;λ(k);H) + e(k)λ , (21b)
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Algorithm 3 Resilient PD-DRA
1: Input: Each agent has initial state θ
(0)
i .
2: for k = 1, 2, ... do
3: (At the Central Coordinator):
(a) Receives {r(k)i }Ni=1, see (9), from agents.
(b) Computes robust mean θ̂
(k)
H using the estimator (17) or Algorithm 2.
(c) Broadcasts the vectors θ̂
(k)
H and ĝ
(k)
H :=
∑T
t=1 λ
(k)
t ∇θgt(θ̂(k)H ) to agents.
(d) Computes the update for λ(k+1) with (20).
4: (At each agent i):
(a) Agent receives θ̂
(k)
H and ĝ
(k)
H .
(b) Agent computes update for θ
(k+1)
i with (19).
5: end for
where we have used concatenated variable as θ = (θ1, ...,θN ) and λ = (λ1, ..., λT ). Under H1 and
assuming that λ
(k)
t ≤ λ for all k, we have:
‖e(k)θ ‖ ≤ λLT‖θ̂(k)H − θ
(k)
H ‖, (22)
‖e(k)λ ‖ ≤ BT‖θ̂(k)H − θ
(k)
H ‖. (23)
The assumption λ
(k)
t ≤ λ can be guaranteed since gt( |H|N θ̂
(k)
H ) is bounded.
4.1 Convergence Analysis
Finally, based on Lemma 2, we can analyze the convergence of Algorithm 3. Let ẑ⋆ = (θ̂⋆, λ̂⋆) be
a saddle point of (P’) and define
Φ(z(k)) :=
(
∇θLυ({θ(k)i }i∈H,λ(k);H)
−∇λLυ({θ(k)i }i∈H,λ(k);H)
)
, (24)
Theorem 1. Assume the map Φ(z(k)) is LΦ-Lipschitz continuous. For Algorithm 3, for all k ≥ 0
it holds
‖z(k+1) − ẑ⋆‖2 ≤ (1− γυ + 2γ2L2Φ)‖z(k) − ẑ⋆‖2
+
(4γ
υ
+ 2γ2
)
Ek.
(25)
where Ek := ‖e(k)θ ‖2 + ‖e(k)λ ‖2 is the total perturbation at iteration k. Moreover, if we choose
γ < υ/2L2Φ and Ek is upper bounded by E for all k, then
lim sup
k→∞
‖z(k) − ẑ⋆‖2 ≤
4
υ
+ 2γ
υ − 2γL2Φ
E. (26)
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Combining the results from the last subsection, the theorem shows the desired result that the
resilient PD-DRA method converges to a O(α2R2d) neighborhood of the saddle point of (P’), if
the median-based estimator (17) is used [or O(αR2) if Algorithm 2 is used], where α is the fraction
of attacked uplink channels. Moreover, it shows that the convergence rate to the neighborhood is
linear, which is similar to the classical PDA analysis [1].
Interestingly, Theorem 1 illustrates a trade-off in the choice of the step size γ between convergence
speed and accuracy. In specific, (25) shows that the rate of convergence factor 1− γυ+2γ2L2Φ can
be minimized by setting γ = υ/(4L2Φ). However, in the meantime, the asymptotic upper bound in
(26) is increasing with γ and it can be minimized by setting γ → 0. This will be a design criterion
to be explored in practical implementations.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied the strategies for securing a primal-dual algorithm for distributed re-
source allocation. Particularly, we propose a resilient distributed algorithm based on primal-dual
optimization and robust statistics. We derive bounds for the performance of the studied algorithm
and show that it converges to a neighborhood of a robustified resource allocation problem when
the number of attacked channels is small.
Acknowledgement
The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for feedback, and Mr. Berkay Turan
(UCSB) for pointing out typos in the original submission of this paper.
A Proof of Lemma 1
Since gt is Lt-smooth, the following holds
gt
(
1
N
∑N
i=1 θi
) ≤ gt( 1N ∑i∈H θi)
+ 1
N
∑
j∈A
〈
θj ,∇gt
(
1
N
∑
i∈H θi
)〉
+ Lt
2N2
∥∥∑
j∈A θj
∥∥2 (27)
Furthermore, observe that the gradient of gt is uniformly bounded by B and the diameter of Cj is
R, then the right hand side of (27) can be upper bounded by
gt
(
1
N
∑
i∈H θi
)
+ 1
N
∑
j∈A
(
RB + 12LR
2
)
(28)
As such, defining ct :=
|A|
N
(
RB + 12LR
2
)
, it can be seen that
gt
(
1
N
∑
i∈H θi
)
+ ct ≤ 0, t = 1, ..., T (29)
implies the desired constraint in (10).
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B Proof of Proposition 1
Fix any j ∈ [d]. The assumption implies that for all i ∈ H, one has∣∣[θ(k)i − θ(k)H ]j∣∣ ≤ r. (30)
We observe that |H| ≥ (1−α)N . Applying [8, Lemma 1] shows that the median estimator1 satisfies
∣∣[θ(k)med − θ(k)H ]j∣∣ ≤ (1− α)
√
1
1− 2αr. (31)
The above implies that for all i ∈ H, we have
∣∣[θ(k)i − θ(k)med]j∣∣ ≤ (1 +
√
(1− α)2
1− 2α
)
r. (32)
This implies that r
(k)
j ≤
(
1 +
√
(1−α)2
1−2α
)
r since |H| ≥ (1 − α)N . We then bound the performance
of θ̂(k):
(1− α)N [θ̂(k)]j =
∑
i∈N
(k)
j
[r
(k)
i ]j
=
∑
i∈H
[r
(k)
i ]j −
∑
i∈H\N
(k)
j
[r
(k)
i ]j +
∑
i∈A∩N
(k)
j
[r
(k)
i ]j ,
(33)
thus
(1− α)N [θ̂(k) − θ(k)H ]j
= −
∑
i∈H\N
(k)
j
[r
(k)
i − θ
(k)
H ]j +
∑
i∈A∩N
(k)
j
[r
(k)
i − θ
(k)
H ]j .
Notice that |A ∩ N (k)j | ≤ αN and thus |H \ N (k)j | ≤ αN . Gathering terms shows
|[θ̂(k) − θ(k)H ]j | ≤
αN
(1− α)N
(
2 +
√
(1− α)2
1− 2α
)
r. (34)
The above holds for all j ∈ [d]. Applying the norm equivalence shows the desired bound.
C Proof of Lemma 2
Comparing the equations in (21) with (19), (20), we identify that
[
e
(k)
θ
]
i
=
1
N
T∑
t=1
λ
(k)
t
(∇θgt( |H|N θ̂(k)H )−∇θgt( |H|N θ(k)H )) (35)
1At each coordinate, the median is the geometric median estimator of one dimension in [8].
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[
e
(k)
λ
]
t
= gt(
|H|
N
θ̂
(k)
H )− gt( |H|N θ
(k)
H ) (36)
where
[
e
(k)
θ
]
i
denotes the ith block of e
(k)
θ . Using H1 and the said assumptions, we immediately
see that
‖[e(k)θ ]i‖ ≤ λLTN ‖θ̂(k)H − θ(k)H ‖ (37)
which then implies (22). H1 implies that gt is B-Lipschitz continuous, therefore
|[e(k)λ ]t| ≤ B‖θ̂(k)H − θ(k)H ‖, (38)
which implies (23).
D Proof of Theorem 1
Based on Proposition 2, our idea is to perform a perturbation analysis on the PDA algorithm.
Without loss of generality, we assumeN = 1 and denote θ = θ1. To simplify notations, we also drop
the subscript, denote the modified and regularized Lagrangian function as L = Lυ. Furthermore,
we denote the saddle point to (P’) as z⋆ = (θ⋆,λ⋆).
Using the fact that θ⋆ = PC(θ⋆) = PC
(
θ⋆ − γ∇θL(θ⋆,λ⋆)
)
, we observe that in the primal update:
‖θ(k+1) − θ⋆‖2
(a)
≤ ‖θ(k) − θ⋆‖2 − 2γ〈ĝ(k)θ −∇θL(θ⋆,λ⋆),θ(k) − θ⋆〉
+ γ2‖ĝ(k)θ −∇θL(θ⋆,λ⋆)‖2
where (a) is due to the projection inequality ‖PC(x − y)‖ ≤ ‖x − y‖. Furthermore, using the
Young’s inequality, for any c0, c1 > 0, we have
‖θ(k+1) − θ⋆‖2
≤ ‖θ(k) − θ⋆‖2
− 2γ〈∇θL(θ(k),λ(k))−∇θL(θ⋆,λ⋆),θ(k) − θ⋆〉
+γ2(1 + c0)‖∇θL(θ(k),λ(k))−∇θL(θ⋆,λ⋆)‖2
−2γ〈e(k)θ ,θ(k) − θ⋆〉+ γ2
(
1 +
1
c0
)‖e(k)θ ‖2
≤ (1 + 2c1γ) ‖θ(k) − θ⋆‖2
− 2γ〈∇θL(θ(k),λ(k))−∇θL(θ⋆,λ⋆),θ(k) − θ⋆〉
+ γ2(1 + c0)‖∇θL(θ(k),λ(k))−∇θL(θ⋆,λ⋆)‖2
+
(2γ
c1
+ γ2 +
γ2
c0
)
‖e(k)θ ‖2.
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Similarly, in the dual update we get,
‖λ(k+1) − λ⋆‖2
≤ ‖λ(k) − λ⋆‖2 + γ2‖ĝ(k)λ −∇λL(θ⋆,λ⋆)‖2
+ 2γ〈ĝ(k)λ −∇λL(θ⋆,λ⋆),λ(k) − λ⋆〉
≤ (1 + 2c1γ) ‖λ(k) − λ⋆‖2
+ 2γ〈∇λL(θ(k),λ(k))−∇λL(θ⋆,λ⋆),λ(k) − λ⋆〉
+ γ2(1 + c0)‖∇λL(θ(k),λ(k))−∇λL(θ⋆,λ⋆)‖2
+
(2γ
c1
+ γ2 +
γ2
c0
)
‖e(k)λ ‖2.
Summing up the two inequalities gives:
‖z(k+1) − z⋆‖2
≤ (1 + 2c1γ) ‖z(k) − z⋆‖2 +
(2γ
c1
+ γ2 +
γ2
c0
)
Ek
− 2γ〈Φ(z(k))−Φ(z⋆),z(k) − z⋆〉
+ γ2(1 + c0)‖Φ(z(k))−Φ(z⋆)‖2
(a)
≤
(
1 + 2γ(c1 − υ) + γ2(1 + c0)L2Φ
)
‖z(k) − z⋆‖2
+
(2γ
c1
+ γ2 +
γ2
c0
)
Ek,
where (a) uses the strong monotonicity and smoothness of the map Φ. Setting c1 = υ/2 yields
‖z(k+1) − z⋆‖2
≤
(
1− γυ + γ2(1 + c0)L2Φ
)
‖z(k) − z⋆‖2
+
(4γ
υ
+ γ2 +
γ2
c0
)
Ek.
(39)
Observe that we can choose γ such that 1− γυ+ γ2(1+ c0)L2Φ < 1. Moreover, the above inequality
implies that ‖z(k) − z⋆‖2 evaluates to
‖z(k+1) − z⋆‖2
≤ (1− γυ + γ2(1 + c0)L2Φ)k‖z(0) − z⋆‖2+
k∑
ℓ=1
(1− γυ + γ2(1 + c0)L2Φ)k−ℓ
(4γ
υ
+ γ2 +
γ2
c0
)
Eℓ
If Ek ≤ E for all k, then z(k) converges to a neighborhood of z⋆ of radius
lim sup
k→∞
‖z(k) − z⋆‖2 ≤
4γ
υ
+ γ2 + γ
2
c0
γυ − γ2(1 + c0)L2Φ
E (40)
Setting c0 = 1 concludes the proof.
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